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SUBJECT: 63RD UNGA/FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): DAY ONE, TWO AND  
THREE OF THEMATIC DEBATE - NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This is UNFC-5

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C1 Days 1, 2 and 3 10-14, 10-15 and 10-16  
Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons - Summary  
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11. (U) Summary: The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security conducted its thematic debate on nuclear weapons from October 14 to 16. This summary comprises statements from all three days (October 14, 15 and 16) of the debate. On Day 1, representatives from the following states spoke: France on behalf of the EU, Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group, Brazil on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Indonesia on behalf of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), Kyrgyzstan on behalf of Central Asia, Canada, and South Africa. In a right of reply, Syria responded to France's statement on behalf of the EU referring to Syria's construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor, stating that it adhered to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA. On Day 2, representatives from the following international organizations opened the debate, followed by additional statements by states' representatives: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Conference on Disarmament (CD), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Australia, Chile, Norway, Pakistan, Japan, Austria, Russia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Cuba, and Kuwait. In a right of reply, Syria responded to Australia's statement on Syria's undeclared nuclear reactor, defending its record of compliance and stating that Australia ignored the threat of Israel's nuclear weapons. On Day 3, representatives from the following states spoke: South Africa on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), United Kingdom, Mongolia, United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Turkey, Bangladesh, Burma, Republic of Korea (ROK), Algeria, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Qatar, India, Switzerland, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

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10/14, Day 1 - France on behalf of the EU,  
Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group,  
Brazil on behalf of (MERCOSUR), Indonesia  
on behalf of the NAM, Kyrgyzstan on behalf  
of Central Asia, Canada, and South Africa  
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¶2. (U) France on behalf of the EU: Called for strengthening disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and agreements by negotiating new treaties, such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). It stated that the 2010 NPT Review Conference should include measures to discourage states from withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The EU urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Commission to share with states their experiences with export controls

with non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to help address increasing trade in nuclear-related items. It stated it supported further progress on U.S.-Russian efforts to establish a post-START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) arrangement and reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles.

¶3. (U) Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group: Stated that establishing a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) was of the utmost importance. The Group added that Israel's non-adherence to the NPT was a deterrent to ridding the region of nuclear weapons. It called on all states to comply with the NPT, emphasizing that all Arab Group states abide by it.

¶4. (U) Brazil on behalf of MERCOSUR: Argued that the indefinite extension of the NPT did not entail the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states (NWS). MERCOSUR called on states that have not yet signed or ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to do so. It also called on states to sign or ratify the treaties establishing NWFZs.

¶5. (U) Indonesia on behalf of the NAM: Expressed concern about NWS' resistance to eliminating nuclear arsenals and about certain strategic defense doctrines, such as the NATO Alliance Strategic Concept. The NAM stated in particular that the United States improved existing nuclear weapons and envisaged new weapons as part of its nuclear posture review. The NAM alleged that these actions contravened security assurances by the United States. The NAM called on the United States and Russia to further reduce nuclear arsenals and added that reductions in deployments and operational status were not substitutes. The NAM also said that it was concerned about the deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems.

¶6. (U) Kyrgyzstan on behalf of Central Asia: Stated that an important part of the Central Asian NWFZ (CANWFZ) was for NWS to provide security assurances to NNWS. The Central Asia Group praised the CANWFZ as a breakthrough in the stalemate in disarmament discussions. The Group added that parliaments of several governments had moved "forward toward supporting" the CANWFZ.

¶7. (U) Canada: Highlighted what it deemed successes in arms control and disarmament. Canada mentioned the United Kingdom's plans to reduce its strategic arsenal and develop,

with Norway, a project to determine how an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons could be verified. Canada also mentioned that the United States' dismantling efforts were ahead of schedule. It welcomed the five new CTBT "ratifiers:" the Bahamas, Barbados, Malaysia, Burundi, and Colombia. It noted North Korea's readmission of inspectors and recommencement of disablement.

¶18. (U) South Africa: Argued that negative security assurances (NSAs) from NWS were a key element of the NPT. South Africa

also advocated for early entry into force of the CTBT. It expressed disappointment with the CD's inability to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

¶19. (U) Rights of Reply:

Syria (followed by France): Addressed France's statement on behalf of the EU in which it referenced France's October 6 remark stating that Syria maintained an undeclared nuclear reactor. Syria noted that it adhered to the NPT and the IAEA, and mentioned a September 2008 IAEA letter highlighting Syria's compliance. France responded, stating that the EU hoped that Syria would continue cooperating with the IAEA.

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10/15, Day 2 - United Nations Office  
for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA),  
Conference on Disarmament (CD),  
Organization for the Prohibition of  
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Preparatory  
Commission of the Comprehensive  
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO),  
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),  
Australia, Chile, Norway, Pakistan, Japan,  
Austria, Russia, New Zealand, Indonesia,  
Cuba, and Kuwait  
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¶10. (U) Opening Remarks: UNODA (Sergio Duarte, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs) characterized the state of disarmament and arms control as "unstable." UNODA stated that a lack of any multilateral legal obligations in certain fields, e.g. missiles, created challenges for related legal regimes, such as the NPT and CTBT. The CD's Deputy Secretary General, Tim Caughley, stated that it had come closer to a program of work. It considered its main development of 2008 to be the proposal by the six presidents to address the Conference's agenda priorities. The OPCW's Director General, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, stated as of September 2008 that it had verified the destruction of 41.25 percent of declared Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles, 51.8 percent of declared Category 2 chemical weapon stockpiles, and 100 percent of declared Category 3 chemical weapon stockpiles. The CTBTO Prepcom's Executive Secretary, Tibor Toth, reported that it now had 180 members and nearly 70 percent of the International Monitoring System had been certified. On verification, he noted its participation in Kazakhstan's integrated field exercise. The IAEA's Representative of the Director General, Gustavo Zlauvinen, stated that 30 NPT NNWS had not yet entered into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and more than 100 states had not yet acceded to the Additional Protocols. It added that it evaluated more than 160 states and applied safeguards to more than 950 nuclear facilities and installations.

¶11. (U) Australia: It welcomed the nuclear warhead reductions

that the United States and Russia carried out and added that further cuts beyond the "Moscow Treaty" would be necessary. Australia lamented that nine Annex 2 states had yet to ratify the CTBT. It expressed support for the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement and noted the U.S. removal of the DPRK from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

¶12. (U) Chile: It highlighted the importance of the Kissinger, Shultz, Nunn, and Perry Wall Street Journal articles that Chile stated recognized the need to move toward disarmament. Chile called on states to move toward entry into force of the CTBT and to take additional steps to "elaborate" on the FMCT.

¶13. (U) Norway: Norway underscored the February 2008 Oslo recommendations, including the need to move toward establishing non-discriminatory fuel cycle arrangements in cooperation with the IAEA. It also welcomed the Australian-Japanese high-level commission on disarmament and nonproliferation.

¶14. (U) Pakistan: Called on states to enable the CD to address its agenda items, including prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), as well as a verifiable FMCT. It urged NWS to provide NSAs to NNWS. Pakistan stated that it opposed unfair restrictions on states' rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

¶15. (U) Japan: It stated that the Group of Eight (G8) Leaders' Declaration, for the first time, called on states to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles. Japan praised France for having done so, and encouraged the United States and Russia to implement the Moscow Treaty and negotiate a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Japan noted the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement and reaffirmed its commitment to the Six Party negotiations.

¶16. (U) Austria: Austria, in a slightly veiled reference to the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, lamented the NSG's decision regarding an export control exemption for a non-NPT member state. It argued that the exemption called into question whether the international community accorded the Treaty the same priority it did 10 years ago. Austria advocated advancing "multilateralization" of the nuclear fuel cycle, and as a first step, creating an international fuel reserve under IAEA auspices.

¶17. (U) Russia: Stated that it had been negotiating with the current U.S. Administration for over three years to create an accord to replace START. Russia called on states, mentioning in particular the nine Annex 2 states, to sign or ratify the CTBT. It expressed support for the CANWFZ and SEANWFZ. Russia deemed "fundamental" NWS' granting of NSAs to NNWS, and added that it had provided such assurances to over 100 states.

¶18. (U) New Zealand: Reiterated that its focus would remain

on the NPT and advocated states' pursuit of confidence building measures (CBMs), such as systematized nuclear accounting and nuclear weapons de-alerting. It stated it would again propose a resolution on de-alerting. New Zealand re-confirmed its commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It noted that last year it joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

¶19. (U) Indonesia: Indonesia called on NWS to move away from rhetoric and take steps toward disarmament, adding that interim measures such as nuclear weapons de-alerting would be necessary. It argued that nuclear cooperation between NPT parties and non-parties will undermine the Treaty.

¶20. (U) Cuba: Stated that of the approximately 32,300 nuclear weapons in existence, over 12,000 were ready for immediate use, and argued that it was an incentive for proliferation. Cuba emphasized the importance of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ's) 1996 opinion on the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to disarmament. Cuba reiterated it considered nuclear weapons "illegal" and "immoral."

¶21. (U) Kuwait: Expressed support for a Middle East NWFZ and called on Israel to accede to the NPT. Kuwait stated that current scope of global and regional challenges made it

adhere more to international instruments and relevant disarmament agreements.

¶22. (U) Right of Reply:

Syria: Responded to Australia's statement in which it accused Syria of constructing an undeclared nuclear reactor. Syria chastised Australia for ignoring the threat of Israel's nuclear weapons, its continued violation of international law, and aggression against Syria. Syria stated that Australia should have commended Syria for its compliance and condemned Israel for its refusal to join the NPT.

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10/16, Day 3 - South Africa on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), United Kingdom, Mongolia, United States, China, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, Turkey, Bangladesh, Burma, Republic of Korea (ROK), Algeria, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Qatar, India, Switzerland, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)  
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¶23. (U) South Africa on behalf of the NAC: Introduced the NAC's draft resolution on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The NAC stated that it would accelerate implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements stemming from the 1995 and 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences (RevCons).

¶24. (U) United Kingdom: Stated that it made substantial progress toward fulfilling NPT Article VI obligations, adding

that it had dismantled maritime nuclear capability and the WE 177 nuclear bomb and terminated nuclear Lance missiles and artillery roles. The United Kingdom highlighted that it was the only NWS to reduce its deterrent capability to a single nuclear weapon system. It added that it reduced its nuclear warhead stockpile to fewer than 160, as well as the operability status of its remaining weapons. Regarding its Trident submarine in particular, the United Kingdom stated that it was at several days "notice to fire." To explore further nuclear disarmament measures, including challenges to technical verification, the United Kingdom noted that it had discussed hosting a P-5 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) conference. It welcomed the U.S.-Russian announcement to work on a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

¶25. (U) Mongolia: Focused on the importance of states' cooperation with the IAEA to make more effective and bolster the safeguards system, as well as strengthen the IAEA's legal authority. Mongolia also addressed the promotion of NWFZs, stating that two of the five had yet to enter into force. Mongolia called for a study on existing NWFZs, addressing, for example, what role they have played and how they can build confidence. It stated that it was establishing a single-state NWFZ and had presented, in 2007, a trilateral treaty to its neighbors to define and institutionalize that status. It added that it would table a draft resolution of a "procedural nature" on that issue.

¶26. (U) China: Reiterated its commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons or non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS or NWFZs. China advocated early entry into force and ratification of the CTBT, adding that it would honor its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests. China called on the "two states (United States and Russia) with the largest nuclear arsenals" to reduce them further. China also urged states to repatriate weapons they had positioned elsewhere (Note: The United States is the only state that has nuclear weapons stationed outside of its borders. End Note).

¶27. (U) United Arab Emirates: Advocated a Middle East NWFZ and called on Israel to comply with the NPT RevCon's 1995 Middle East resolution, as well as the relevant UN resolutions. It also urged Iran to continue cooperating with the IAEA and the international community to dispel doubts



about its nuclear program.

¶28. (U) Mexico: Stated that states cannot select "a la carte" which commitments to honor and which to disregard, and added that it rejected discriminatory application of the NPT. Mexico also stated that some states are giving priority to nonproliferation over disarmament and warned that unless they corrected that imbalance, paralysis of the disarmament machinery would continue. It stated that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) would hold a second meeting in May to strengthen cooperation among states parties to NWFZ Treaties.

¶29. (U) Turkey: Stated that early entry into force of the CTBT was essential, called on Annex 2 states to sign or ratify it, and welcomed Iraq's signing. Turkey stated that it would continue to contribute to the IAEA's work during its Board of Governors tenure. It also stated that it supported in principle a Middle East NWFZ. Turkey expressed support for the Conference on Disarmament's (CD's) efforts to realize Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. It expressed appreciation for NPT states parties' efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Turkey welcomed the recent U.S.-DPRK agreement on verification measures.

¶30. (U) Bangladesh: Argued for building upon the 13 practical steps that the 2000 NPT RevCon adopted. Bangladesh highlighted it was the first South Asian state to sign and ratify the CTBT and added that it had also concluded IAEA safeguard agreements. It appealed to the Annex 2 states to sign or ratify the CTBT. Bangladesh reiterated its support for NWFZs in South Asia and the Middle East.

¶31. (U) Burma: Called on states to implement the 13 practical steps and introduced a draft resolution to that effect, entitled Nuclear Disarmament. Burma stated that it had the support of all Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, many NAM states, as well as others. Burma emphasized the importance of the ICJ's 1996 opinion on states' obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to disarmament.

¶32. (U) Republic of Korea: Stated that a gap existed between NWS and NNWS and called on states to implement NPT Article VI. The ROK acknowledged U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal reductions and welcomed France and the UK's unilateral measures to do the same. Regarding the North Korea nuclear issue, the ROK praised the U.S. action to remove the DPRK from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and hoped that such measures would move forward the Six Party negotiations.

¶33. (U) Algeria: Reiterated that NNWS have the right to legally binding guarantees of the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from NWS. Algeria advocated the creation of NWFZs to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and disarmament efforts.

¶34. (U) Kazakhstan: Stated that the September 2008 Semipalatinsk on-site inspection field exercise to detect nuclear tests demonstrated its commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation. Kazakhstan added that the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO used the site for a project and added that it had become a "neutral strip" for resolving sensitive issues. It noted that it had become a party to the International Center for Uranium Enrichment, which it hoped would facilitate international cooperation on a shared nuclear fuel supply.

¶35. (U) Egypt: Introduced two draft resolutions, one calling

for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the other addressing the risk of nuclear proliferation in that region.

¶36. (U) Qatar: Praised its adherence to the NPT and CTBT.

Qatar expressed support for resolutions relating to creating NWFZs, as well as those including Security Council resolutions calling on Israel to adhere to the NPT.

¶37. (U) India: Reiterated its commitment to former PM Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 "Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order," and added that it held a June 2008 Conference to mark the 20th anniversary of the Plan. India noted the Kissinger, Shultz, Perry, and Nunn Wall Street Journal articles on the need to work toward disarmament. It stated that it would introduce three resolutions: a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear danger, and measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD.

¶38. (U) Switzerland: Praised France for inviting observers to witness the dismantlement of its former fissile material production sites and called on other NWS to increase transparency. It stated that it found it difficult to understand how NWS could speak about disarmament while building new types of nuclear weapons, an action it deemed counter to NPT Article VI. Switzerland stated that the Nuclear Suppliers Group's decision to permit nuclear supplies to India could be considered "constructive" but raised questions about the future of the NPT regime.

¶39. (U) Democratic People's Republic of Korea: The DPRK lamented that the threat of nuclear weapons from NWS against NNWS was growing. It emphasized that the final goal of the Six Party negotiations was to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and not to unilaterally disarm the DPRK. It accused Japan of being the only country that refuses to comply with the Six Party negotiations and added that its presence was unnecessary. Regarding UN Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), the DPRK stated that they were products of the Security Council's "irresponsibility and unfairness."  
Khalilzad